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Abstract 
 
The aim of this work is to solve the problem of non-additivity revealed by the works 
that calculate the redistributive effect of the budget or public policies made up of 
different instruments of income or public spending. We use Shapley’s value to do this. 
This technique allows us to decompose the redistributive effect and the vertical and 
horizontal effects consistently and not arbitrarily. The main result obtained for the case 
of taxes and social transfers in the US is that previous calculations undervalued the 
redistributive effects and their vertical and horizontal components for taxes and 
transfers. Undervaluation is more important for taxes.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Within public economy studies there is an important tradition in the analysis of the 
redistributive effects of taxes. One of the most used indicators to calculate redistributive 
effects is the difference in Gini indexes before and after taxes (Reynolds y Smolensky, 
1977). Its versatility and simplicity has meant the extending of the measure to all kinds 
of public intervention instruments1 and even to the analysis of  redistributive effect of 
the whole budget2. An additional refinement is in decomposing the Reynolds-
Smolensky index to assess the effects on vertical equity and reranking, according to the 
method of Kakwani (1984), or also on horizontal inequality, according to the proposal 
of Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994). 
The problem of works that calculate the redistributive impacts of policies made up of 
various instruments or the whole budget is that they tend to present inconsistent results. 
Additive inconsistence is produced when the sum of the redistributive effects of each 
instrument does not coincide with the redistributive effect of the measures taken as a 
whole. This non-additivity is due to calculating the redistributive effects of each 
instrument only taking as a reference the original income and excluding the other 
instruments. That is, the interaction between instruments having an effect on the 
redistributive effect is not taken into account. 
The most elemental solution to take this interaction into account is to sequentially 
aggregate the different instruments to calculate their redistributive impacts. This was 
done by: Ferrarini and Nelson (2003) in a compared study of the financing and spending 
of the social insurance in ten countries, Keselman and Cheung (2004) to analyze the 
budget in Canada, Mahler and Jesuit (2006) for the budget in developed countries via 
the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data set, or Wolff and Zacharias (2007) for the 
budget in the US. The problem that this solution produces is that the redistributive 
effects calculated for the same policy are different according to the sequence chosen. 
That is, a problem of arbitrariness and judgment values arises.  
The aim that we set out for this work is to solve the problem of inconsistency of the 
decomposition of the redistributive effects without incurring in arbitrariness. To achieve 
this we propose additively decomposing the Reynolds-Smolensky index, and its 
disaggregation into vertical and horizontal effects in the manner of Kakwani (1984) or 
Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994), applying the Shapley´s value (1953). In broad 
terms, this technique considers the marginal effect on budget of eliminating each of the 
contributory factors in sequence, and then assigns to each factor the average of its 
marginal contributions in all possible elimination sequences. Shorrocks (1999), 
instigator of its use for the decomposing of inequality indicators, 3 shows that the sum of 
these effects is consistent and symmetrical.  
                                                 
1 For  spending policies in the US compared with other countries we can see Mahler and Jesuit (2006), 
Marical, et. al (2008),  Tanzi (2008), Warren (2008) or Prasad (2008). 
2 Among the most recent we find those of  Atkitson (2004), Smeeding (2005),  Förster and Mira d’Ercole 
(2005) or Garfinkel, Rainwater and Smeeding (2006) in which the redistributive effects of the US 
Administration budget are compared with the results obtained in other countries. For other countries see 
Forteza and Rossi (2009) for Uruguay, Bargain and Callan (2010) for the EU, Clark and Leicester (2004) 
for the UK or Fuchs and Lietz (2007) for Austria. 
3 Previous Works belong to Rongve (1995) and Chantreuil and Trannoy (1997). This methodology has 
been employed more profusely in the decomposing of poverty indicators, see as examples Kolenikov and 
Shorrocks (2005), Sami and Duclos (2008) or Deustsch and Silber (2008). 
 
To present analytical results we are going to take as a reference the recent work of Kim 
and Lambert (2009) in which the redistributive impact is analyzed for taxes and social 
spending in the USA for the years 1994, 1999 and 2004.4 Our calculations will allow 
the consistent and symmetrical decomposing of the total redistributive effect, the 
vertical effect, the horizontal inequality and the reranking that taxes and social benefits 
produce in the US and compare the results with those of the article cited. From this 
comparison we will be able to draw conclusions about the consequences of assessing 
redistributive effects that do not produce consistent results. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discuss the problems of  traditional 
methodologies of redistributive decomposition and  the relative merits of the Shapley 
decomposition. In section 3 we apply our proposal. The last section summarizes the 
results obtained and offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Methodology 
One of the most usual ways of measuring the redistributive effect is the comparison of 
the Gini index of the initial income (market income) with the Gini index of the final 
income (post-tax income) (Reynolds and Smolensky 1977): 
 
TXXTX GRE −− −= G       (1) 
 
At the same time, the most used ways of calculating the vertical and horizontal 
redistributive effects of the taxes are those devised by Kakwani (1984) and Aronson, 
Johnson and Lambert (1994).5 The first distinguishes between the vertical effect and 
reranking: 
TXTXTX RRE −−− −= V      (2) 
 
And the second also identifies the horizontal inequality without an order change:6 
TXTXTXTX RHRE −−−− −−= V    (3) 
                                                 
4 Other recent works that are concerned with the redistributive effect of this type of policies are those of 
Verbist (2007) for taxes on work, pensions and unemployment benefits in the EU-15, Ferrario and 
Zanardi (2009) for the National Health of Italy or Biggs et al (2009) for the National Health in the USA. 
There is also a broad literature of health spending from the work of Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1997)for 
the health  spending  and financing in Holland, which later Van Doorslaer et. al (1998) extended to an 
important group of countries. 
5 There is another decomposing alternative put forward by Lerman and Yitzaki (1995), in which the order 
change is assessed first, and then V is resolved as the income change, but with the final order. 
6 In spite of the terminology being undistinguishable, it must be pointed out that the original values of V 
and R are not coincident in both formulas. The work of Urban and Lambert (2008) recently put forward a 
reformulating of the values given by Aronson, Johnson and Lambert that identifies the relationship 
between both equations. 
 
The vertical effect is defined by the difference between pre-tax distribution inequality 
index and the inequality index of a fictitious income distribution obtained with the aid 
of taxation not generating either horizontal effects or reranking effects.  This fictitious 
taxation leads to the pre-tax income of a household of rank in the distribution of pre-tax 
income being equal to its expected net income before taxation. Furthermore, the effect 
(V) measures the redistributive effect generated by the taxation system. This difference 
is positive if the taxation system is progressive and  negative if it is regressive. The 
horizontal inequality (H), on the other hand, relates to unequal treatment of equals. A 
further concept of reranking (R) corresponds to the income scale rank-switching 
induced by the fiscal system.  7 
In theory, for each of the m instruments a j ,(j=1,…,m) that make up a policy M we can 
calculate its respective redistributive effects REX +a j and the problem of inconsistency or 
asymmetry is given because REX +M ≠ REX +a J
J=1
M∑ . The same takes place for V, H and R. 
As was cited above, the most elemental solution to the problem is to establish a 
sequence. To see the problem that it produces, we take the example of the work of 
Wolff and Zacharias (2007), in which the effects of taxes and spending for the years 
1989 and 2000 in U.S. are analyzed. The authors first calculate the redistributive effects 
for the taxes (T), then for the transfers (Tr) and finally for public consumption (E) and 
the results fulfil the additive property 8. Now, why choose this sequence and not another 
(T+E+Tr, E+T+Tr, E+Tr+T, Tr+E+T o Tr+T+E)? If we did this, we would have  
obtained different redistributive impacts  for each instrument according to the sequence 
used. That is, the order influences the result. To sum up, if we change the order, the 
redistributive effect values change, producing asymmetrical results.  
If this is so, what value do we take? Why must taxes precede public spending? It would 
not seem reasonable to us to consider that the administration first receives payments and 
then spends. Then, this sequence does not have the guarantee of certainty. Spending can 
be financed from the public deficit and in this case the spending is first and the taxes 
come afterwards. What happens when taxes fall back on transfers received? The reality 
is that modern economies are complex and it is not possible to find unquestionable 
sequences in the budget procedure. This is why to choose a sequence implies 
arbitrariness and the establishing of a value judgment that conditions the results. 
We can find the problem´s solution calculating the decomposition via the value of 
Shapley (1953). This methodology comes from game theory and has been applied in the 
study of inequality since the work of Shorrocks (1999).9 The applying of Shapley´s 
value allows an additive, symmetrical and exact decomposition for any index. 
                                                 
7 See decompostion of taxes in Creedy and Van Ven (2001),  for  Australia, Urban (2008) for Croacia, 
Lambert and Thoresen, T (2009) for Norway. 
8 This can be checked in their Table 6 (Wolff and Zacharias, 2007, p.710). 
9 See Chantreuil and Trannoy (1999); Sastre and  Trannoy (2002), Deustch and Silber (2008). 
 
The system consists of quantifying the impact of a factor calculating the average of the 
marginal effects, determined by the elimination of the said factor in all the possible 
sequences. 
Indeed, let M be the set of instruments a j , { }mMj ,....2,1=∈ , that make up a public 
policy. Let G  be a subset of M  made up of g  instruments. Let GXRE +  be the value of 
RE when the instruments a j , MGj ⊆∉  have been eliminated. If all the sizes are 
equally probable, a determined size  g  will occur with a probability of g/1 . On the 
other hand, if we have a determined instrument a j  that belongs to a subgroup G , the 
)1( −g  instruments remaining of this subgroup can be chosen between the  )1( −m  
instruments remaining in a number of sequences equal to: 
(m −1)!
(m −1) − (g −1)[ ]!(g −1)! =
(m −1)!
(m − g)!(g −1)!   (4) 
The probability of one of these combinations being chosen is the reciprocal. Therefore, 
the probability of a group G containing the element a j  is equal to the said reciprocal 
multiplied by  m/1 . 
If we take into account the marginal contribution of a j ∈ G  to the inequality of the 
subgroup G  it is:  
REX +G
j = REX +G − REX +(G−a j )    (5) 
The contribution of the instrument a j   to the total value of the index MXRE + is equal to 
the summation of all the groupings that can contain it, pondered by the probability of 
them occurring: 
RE X +M
j = (m − g)!(g −1)!
m!G⊆M
j∈G
∑ REX +G − RE X +(G−a j )[ ]  (6) 
Such that: 
REX +M = RE X +Mj
j=1
m∑   (7) 
This expression is generalizable to determine the contribution of each ja  to the indices 
MXV + , MXH +  and MXR +  such that:  
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(9) 
With this methodology the sequence ceases to be determinant. All the possible 
combinations are considered and the interaction of the instruments that make up the 
policy is taken into account. 
To appreciate the consequences of its application, we are going to use the case of a 
policy with two instruments, for example taxes (T) and transfers (B). Such that for 
equation 7 must be met:  
RE X −T +B =    RE X −T +BT + RE X −T +BB   (10) 
Being:  
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Taking these results, we can construct Table 1, in which are included the solution 
obtained via applying Shapley´s value and the two possible sequences. These latter 
produce consistent results but they are not symmetrical.  
 
Table 1. Decomposition of the redistributive effect of a public policy made up of 
two instruments, taxes and transfers. 
 
 
Sequence 1 
(-T+B) 
Sequence 2 
(B-T) 
Shapley Solution 
Taxes 
 
TXRE −  
(I) 
BXBTX RERE ++− −  
(III) 
TXBXBTX
T
BTX RERERERE −++−+− +−= 2
1)(
2
1
)  
(V) 
Transfers 
 
TXBTX RERE −+− −  
(II) 
BXRE +  
(IV) 
BXTXBTX
B
BTX RERERERE +−+−+− +−= 2
1)(
2
1  
(VI) 
Total 
 
BTXRE +−  
(VII) 
BTXRE +−  
(VII) 
BTXRE +−  
(VII) 
Source: own elaboration. 
The problem of inconsistency that tends to appear in works of this kind, such as 
happens in Kim and Lambert (2009), originates in calculating the total effect, VII and 
the effects I and IV. The three effects are estimated as the marginal effect on the initial 
income, but in VII the interaction of both instruments is taken into account, while in I 
and IV it is not. This inconsistency is also produced in the case of our calculating the 
partial effects III and II (calculating the redistributive effect of each policy, eliminating 
it in the final income instead of aggregating it to the initial income), as can be observed 
in Inmervoll et. al (2006). 
 For their part, in the works that adopt the sequential solution, as happens in the work of 
Wolff and Zacharias (2007), sequence 1 is opted for (values I and II), which fulfils the 
additive property, but incurs in arbitrariness. Sequence 2 could be taken and the result 
would also be consistent, but with different values (values III and IV).10 
Shapley´s solution consists of calculating the average of the marginal effects of each 
instrument in each sequence. It fulfills the properties of additivity and symmetry 
(V+VI=VII) and takes into account any interaction between instruments. 
In the same way in which we proceed with RE, the vertical, horizontal and reordering 
effects V, H and R can be decomposed. 
 
3. Data and Results 
As was pointed out in the introduction, to contrast the efficiency of the methodology 
proposed and its consequences, we employ the data of the work of Kim and Lambert 
(2009), which is the most recent study for the United States, and we will analyze the 
consequences that derive from the new estimation. In this work, data of personal taxes 
and transfers for social benefits are taken in the United States for the years 1994, 1999 
and 2004 proceeding from the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS). The different 
indexes that we use are computed with the relation specified in equation (3).  
In Table 2 the data offered by the authors is reproduced and the new results with value´s 
Shapley for the three years considered is included.11 As can be observed, taxes and 
transfers reduce the income inequality of the market around 30%. The greatest 
inequality after taxes and transfers is in 2004, as a consequence of the market income 
being divided more unequally.  Taxes have their greatest redistributive effect and their 
greatest relative weight, close to 30%, in 1999. Later they lose importance in favour of 
transfers which are responsible for 76.29% of the redistribution in 2004. Likewise, taxes 
and transfers lose their capacity to correct the vertical inequality of the 1999 market 
income. Nevertheless, the increase of the vertical equality of the transfers means that in 
2004 taxes and transfers together generate the greatest horizontal inequality correction.  
In comparative terms we can see that the redistributive effects of taxes and transfers 
separately are greater than those previously calculated and explain the whole 
redistributive effect. To explain this, we take taxes as an example and with Shapley 
value we calculate the average of the two redistributive effects on the original income 
and on the income after social transfers (I and III of Table 1). When taxes are applied 
after the social transfers, these have already reduced the inequality and consequently 
with the same quantity of resources a greater equality can be attained. The most relevant 
effect for the taxes is that their redistributive effect is broader: they explain between 
                                                 
10 As was pointed out above, in the work of Wolff and Zacharias the marginal effect on the initial income 
of the transfers is also calculated, which is why it can be seen that II and IV do not coincide. 
11 As we did not have at our disposal the intermediate of the Gini indices of the different arrangement 
sequences, we will limit ourselves to disaggregating the redistributive effect of transfers and taxes, 
without continuing the disaggregation of them into the different subelements that they make up. 
 
29.7% (1999) and 23.7% (2004) of the respective total effects. The new calculations 
also show a greater weight in the vertical effects of the taxes. This situation is coherent 
with its greater total redistributive effect.  
It is also observed that, as Kim and Lambert pointed out, there is a certain stability of 
equality loss due to reranking, between 30 and 35% of the redistributive effect. Now, 
with the new calculations we also moreover identify the contribution of each instrument 
to the reranking. Thus, in 1994, 76% of the reranking was produced by transfers and 
24% by taxes. In 2004 the taxes hardly contributed 17.5% of the reranking, which 
means that the transfers have a more unequal distribution in terms of horizontal 
equality.  
Finally we have to highlight, also in the tax ambit, the sign change of the H values. In 
the original calculations the taxes produced inequality as a consequence of unequal 
treatment of equals. The new calculations point out that taxes and transfers follow a 
similar pattern. Inequality due to horizontal inequality is not produced, but rather this 
operates in favour of redistribution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Redistributive Effect of taxes and transfers. Non -additive decomposition vs Shapley decomposition 
   1994   
 Non additive decomposition* Shapley decomposition 
 Absolute value  In percentage of RE Absolute value  
In percentage of 
RE 
In percentage of effect of taxes 
and public transfers 
Taxes (T)       
RE 0,03312   0,040595  26,28% 
VK 0,03961 119,60% 0,053275 131,24% 25,65% 
V 0,03962 119,64% 0,05317 130,96% 25,73% 
H 0,00001 0,02% -0,000115 -0,28% 10,65% 
RK 0,0065 19,62% 0,012685 31,24% 23,83% 
Public Transfers (B)       
RE 0,10638   0,1138505  73,72% 
VK 0,14075   0,154415  74,35% 
V 0,1399 131,51% 0,15345 134,78% 74,27% 
H -0,00085 -0,80% -0,000965 -0,85% 89,35% 
RK 0,03437 32,31% 0,040555 35,62% 76,17% 
Total (N=T-B)       
RE 0,15445   0,1544455  100,00% 
VL 0,20769   0,20769  100,00% 
T by VL decomposition 0,03126   0,053275   
B by VL decomposition 0,17643   0,154415   
V 0,20662 134% 0,20662 133,78% 100,00% 
H -0,00107 -0,69% -0,00108 -0,70% 100,00% 
RK 0,05324 34,47% 0,05324 34,47% 100,00% 
      
   1999   
 Non additive decomposition* Shapley decomposition 
 Absolute value  In percentage of RE Absolute value  
In percentage of 
RE 
In percentage of effect of taxes 
and public transfers 
Taxes (T)           
RE 0,03492   0,04296  29,70% 
VK 0,03847 110,17% 0,051685 120,31% 27,38% 
V 0,03847 110,17% 0,05163 120,18% 27,43% 
H 0,00001 0,02% -0,00005 -0,12% 9,26% 
RK 0,00354 10,15% 0,008725 20,31% 19,79% 
Public Transfers (B)       
RE 0,09367   0,10171  70,30% 
VK 0,12385   0,137065  72,62% 
V 0,12342 131,76% 0,13658 134,28% 72,57% 
H -0,00043 -0,46% -0,00049 -0,48% 90,74% 
RK 0,03018 32,22% 0,035365 34,77% 80,21% 
Total (N=T-B)       
RE 0,14467   0,14467  100,00% 
VL 0,18875   0,18875  100,00% 
T by VL decomposition 0,03144   0,051685   
B by VL decomposition 0,15731   0,137065   
V 0,18821 130% 0,18821 130,10% 100,00% 
H -0,00054 -0,38% -0,00054 -0,37% 100,00% 
RK 0,04409 30,48% 0,04409 30,48% 100,00% 
      
 2004 
 Non additive decomposition* Shapley decomposition 
 Absolute value  In percentage of RE Absolute value  
In percentage of 
RE 
In percentage of effect of taxes 
and public transfers 
Taxes (T)        
RE 0,02954   0,03766  23,71% 
VK 0,03323 112,49% 0,04754 126,23% 22,08% 
V 0,03326 112,57% 0,04747 126,05% 22,14% 
H 0,00002 0,08% -0,000075 -0,20% 8,24% 
RK 0,00369 12,49% 0,00988 26,23% 17,49% 
Public Transfers (B)       
RE 0,11307   0,12119  76,29% 
VK 0,1535   0,16781  77,92% 
V 0,15276 135,10% 0,16697 137,78% 77,86% 
H -0,00074 -0,66% -0,000835 -0,69% 91,76% 
RK 0,04043 35,76% 0,04662 38,47% 82,51% 
Total (N=T-B)       
RE 0,15885   0,15885  100,00% 
VL 0,21535   0,21535  100,00% 
T by VL decomposition 0,02613   0,04754   
B by VL decomposition 0,1892   0,16781   
V 0,21444 135% 0,21444 135,00% 100,00% 
H -0,00091 -0,57% -0,00091 -0,57% 100,00% 
RK 0,0565 35,57% 0,0565 35,57% 100,00% 
* Data obtained from Table 3 from the work of Kim, Lambert (2009). Source:own elaboration.  
The previous information can be completed with that which appears in Table 3. This 
includes the relative variation in the calculations for 2004. We appreciate that the data 
of Kim and Lambert (2009) undervalued all the indices, but in comparative terms the 
indicators of the redistributive effect of the taxes were more affected than those of the 
transfers. The undervaluing of the redistributive effect of the taxes triples that of the 
transfers. What is more, we can also see that the previous calculations undervalued 
more the inequality associated with the horizontal inequality and the reranking than the 
vertical redistributive effect.  
 To sum up, for the years analyzed the result we obtain is that the redistributive effects 
of taxes and social transfers are greater than those calculated on the initial income. At 
the same time, the calculations allow us to conclude that the undervaluing of the 
redistributive effect is greater in the case of the taxes. According to our estimation, the 
relative weight of the taxes would represent around 25% of the total redistribution, 
which contrasts with 12% attributed by Kim and Lambert for 2004. That is, the weight 
of the taxes in the redistribution in the US for the years considered is notably greater 
when it is assessed taking into account the rest of the policy it is part of or with which it 
is associated. 
 
Table 3. Non additive decomposition vs Shapley decomposition. % differences. 2004  
  Taxes   Public Transfers (B)  
 Non additive decomposition Shapley methodology 
Percentage 
change 
Non additive 
decomposition 
Shapley 
methodology 
Percentage 
change 
  (I) (II) ((I-II)/II) (I) (II) ((I-II)/II) 
R
E 0,02954 0,03766 -21,56% 0,11307 0,12119 -6,70% 
VK 0,03323 0,04754 -30,10% 0,1535 0,16781 -8,53% 
V 0,03326 0,04747 -29,93% 0,15276 0,16697 -8,51% 
H 0,00002 -0,00008 -126,67% -0,00074 -0,00084 -11,38% 
RK 0,00369 0,00988 -62,65% 0,04043 0,04662 -13,28% 
  Taxes and Public Transfers (C)    A+B-C  
 Non additive decomposition Shapley methodology 
Percentage 
change 
Non additive 
decomposition 
Shapley 
methodology 
Percentage 
change 
 (I) (II) ((I-II)/II) (I) (II) ((I-II)/II) 
R
E 0,15885 0,15885 0,00% 0,11307 0,12119 -6,70% 
VK 0,21535 0,21535 0,00% 0,1535 0,16781 -8,53% 
V 0,21444 0,21444 0,00% 0,15276 0,16697 -8,51% 
H -0,00091 -0,00091 0,00% -0,00074 -0,00084 -11,38% 
RK 0,0565 0,0565 0,00% 0,04043 0,04662 -13,28% 
Source: own elaboration whit table 2.     
 
4. Repercussions for redistributive impact studies 
As we have been able to check, applying Shapley value to the Reynolds-Smolensky 
index, and its decomposition according to Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994), we 
have managed to determine the contribution relative to the redistributive effect and its 
decomposition into vertical and horizontal impacts of the instruments considered in 
Kim and Lambert (2009). We have consistently calculated the contribution of taxes and 
transfers to the total redistributive effect of the social well-being policies of the United 
States for the years 1994, 1999 and 2004 proceeding from the U.S. Current Population 
Survey (CPS). That is to say, we have achieved symmetrical results without arbitrarily 
introducing criteria, which has at least two repercussions for the redistributive 
assessment of public policies.  
Firstly, that to value a policy we must take into account the problem of judgment values 
and their repercussion on the results. We are going to use Table 4 to show our 
argument. In this table, we have reproduced table 1, but with the values calculated in 
Table 2 for the redistributive effect of 2004. In it one can clearly appreciate the 
possibility of arbitrary influence in the results. Thus, if taxes and transfers are evaluated 
on initial rent (alternative of the boxes I and IV), exactly as we have seen in Table 3, the 
effects of taxes and transfers are undervalued. On the contrary, if taxes and transfers are 
evaluated on income  post-transfers or income post-taxes, respectively, (take the 
opposite alternative, that defined by boxes II and III) then what we do is to overvalue 
the effect of both. On the other hand, if we choose sequential sequence 1 (initial 
income-taxes+transfers) the redistributive effect of the taxes is undervalued and that of 
the transfers is overvalued. Finally, if we choose sequence 2 (initial income+transfers-
taxes), the opposite occurs: the overvaluing is produced in the value of the taxes. That is 
to say, the choice of one alternative or the other gives rise to a specific bias. That is, 
selecting a methodology we can arbitrarily influence the results and these results have a 
greater or lesser redistributive impact on one instrument or another or both. Faced with 
this situation, Shapley´s methodology also produces consistent results and reduces the 
technical possibility of arbitrary manipulation.12 
 
Table 4. Additive decompositions. Redistributive Effect of Taxes and Transfers 2004 
 
 
Sequence 1 
(-T+B) 
Sequence 2 
(B-T) 
Shapley Solution 
Taxes 
 
0.02954 
(I) 
0.04578 
(III) 
0.03766 
(V) 
Transfers 
 
0.12931 
(II) 
0.11307 
(IV) 
0.12119 
(VI) 
Total 
 
0.15885 
(VII) 
0.15885 
(VII) 
0.15885 
(VII) 
Source: own elaboration from Table 2. 
 
The second repercussion is that for policy reforms we can distinguish two types of 
redistributive effects: a marginal one and a redistributive effect of the instrument. 
Indeed, let us suppose that we wish to assess the redistributive effect of a policy reform. 
If the reform consists of introducing a new instrument, we could calculate its 
redistributive effect according to boxes II or III. Now, the impact calculated in this 
manner measures the marginal incidence of its incorporation, but not the redistributive 
effect attributable to the new instrument within the whole policy. To measure the latter 
                                                 
12 The possibility of there being arbitrary manipulation does not,evidently, imply that this is practised. 
 
– that is, the redistributive effect of the instrument- the appropriate procedure is 
decomposition via Shapley´s value.  
The difference is important, as the redistributive effect contains two effects: the 
marginal effect of the instrument itself and that which derives from the alteration that is 
produced in the effects of the remaining instruments. Let us imagine, for example, that 
social transfers do not exist and that they are created. The marginal effect of the creating 
of the transfers in 2004 would be 0.12931 (box II) but the redistributive effect of the 
transfers, as component of one policy, according to Shapley´s decomposition is 0.12119 
(box VI). The difference, 0.00812, is the increase of the redistributive effect attributable 
to the taxes and is because its redistributive effect is reinforced when it is created 
together with the transfer instrument.  
Finally, there exists an additional positive repercussion for the studies of redistributive 
impact. When we apply Shapley´s additive decomposition to the redistributive effect 
and its vertical and horizontal components, we can compare the relative weight of the 
effect of each instrument in percentage terms. This possibility improves the information 
of any compared study, not only the intertemporal comparison as carried out in this 
work, but also the policy comparison or that of tax systems of different countries and 
the comparison of alternatives of the composition of spending or income. 
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